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market design by showing that the restriction to such mechanisms is without loss of generality.
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Efficiency is the key objective of market mechanisms that assign objects or bundles of ob-
jects without the use of transfers. In environments ranging from school choice to course
allocation, standard stochastic assignment mechanisms that only rely on participants’ ordi-
nal rankings over objects or bundles cause efficiency losses.1 Since Hylland and Zeckhauser
(1979), we know that efficient mechanisms can be constructed by endowing market partici-
pants with token money that they can use to buy probability shares in allocated objects, with
the allocation determined via Walrasian equilibrium. The resulting mechanisms—known as
pseudomarkets—became central to the literature on efficient assignment without transfers.2
The outstanding question that the current paper addresses is how flexible is the pseudomar-
ket approach. In particular, can all efficient assignments be implemented via pseudomarkets?
We resolve this question in the positive, thus providing a foundation for the literature’s
focus on pseudomarkets: in market design contexts, our characterization of efficient assign-
ments allows one to restrict attention to pseudomarkets at least in settings, such as large
markets, where pseudomarket price mechanisms are incentive compatible.3 This positive
answer is tantamount to proving for environments without transfers an analogue of the clas-
sic insight of the Walrasian theory of markets commonly referred to as the Second Welfare
Theorem. This classic insight—stating that every Pareto efficient assignment can be decen-
tralized through the use of prices—is predicated on the assumption that agents are locally
non-satiated; an assumption that is readily satisfied in settings with money but typically
fails in settings without transfers studied in this paper.4
We establish a tight link between efficiency and prices despite the failure of local non-
satiation in the no-transfer settings. The feature of the environment that enables this unex-
1Such losses are particularly pronounced when market participants have multi-unit demands as estab-
lished by Budish and Cantillon (2012) and Budish (2011), but they are also present in single-unit demand
environments such as school choice. Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001), Abdulkadiroglu, Che, and Yasuda
(2011), Featherstone and Niederle (2016), Miralles (2008), and Pycia (2014) provide theoretical analyses
of such losses, and Abdulkadiroglu, Agarwal, and Pathak (2017) provide their empirical evaluation. While
deterministic mechanisms fare better—unlike stochastic mechanisms they can be Pareto efficient—in many
environments stochasticity plays an important role, for instance because of fairness considerations, cf. e.g.
Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez (2003).
2We provide a review of this rich literature below.
3See He et al (2018) for asymptotic strategy-proofness of pseudomarkets, Azevedo and Budish (2019) for
their strategy-proofness in the large, and Pycia (2014) for Nash equilibria. While these papers assume that
participants’ budgets are fixed, in an ongoing work we show that this assumption may be relaxed.
4Local non-satiation requires that for any agent and any assignment there is a nearby assignment that the
agent strictly prefers, for instance because it leaves him with more money. In contrast, our agents may be
satiated if they receive their most preferred bundles. The classic Second Welfare Theorem, also known as the
Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics, was conjectured by Pareto (1909), and subsequently
refined and developed by many authors, culminating in the definitive treatment by Arrow (1951) and Debreu
(1951).
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pected link is the discreteness of resources being allocated; otherwise our model is general.
There is a finite set of agents and objects. Agents are assigned bundles of objects and we
impose no assumptions on agents’ utilities from the bundles. Lotteries over bundles are eval-
uated in line with the expected utility theory. As we allow for arbitrary multi-unit demands,
our model accommodates as special cases all types of substitutes, complements, externalities
among objects in the same bundle, as well as the canonical single-unit demand model of
Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979). Extending Hylland and Zeckhauser’s pseudomarkets to our
general setting, we study Walrasian equilibria in which each agent is endowed with token
money; the amount of token money held after the assignment has no impact on agents’
utilities.5
Our main result takes a particularly simple form in the single-unit demand settings such
as school choice: every Pareto efficient assignment may be supported in a Walrasian equi-
librium with properly chosen budgets, and hence decentralized via prices. The link between
efficiency and prices remains valid in the general multi-unit-demand random assignment
model in which agents receive lotteries over bundles of indivisible goods. In the general
multi-unit-demand case the statement of this link is however more subtle because—as we
show in an example—there are environments in which some assignments are Pareto efficient,
in the sense of being undominated by any feasible random assignment, and at the same time
these assignments cannot be supported in any Walrasian equilibrium.6 We thus prove the
Second Welfare Theorem for allocations that are strongly Pareto efficient in the following
sense: they are undominated by random allocations that are feasible at least in expectation.7
Importantly, we prove that strong efficiency is not only sufficient but also necessary for the
Second Welfare Theorem, that is we also prove the analogue of the First Welfare Theorem
for strong efficiency: every Walrasian equilibrium is efficient in the strong sense.8
5For earlier extensions of Hylland and Zeckhauser’s idea to multi-unit demand settings, see Budish (2011)
and Budish et al (2013). In addition to establishing the Second Welfare Theorem in their environments, we
relax the modeling restrictions their analyses rely on.
6The subtlety is caused by the failure of the Birkhoff-von Neumann property: in general random alloca-
tions whose expectations are feasible may fail to be implementable as a lottery over feasible deterministic
assignments. Cf. Nguyen, Peivandi and Vohra (2016) for a discussion of failures of the Birkhoff-von Neu-
mann property. In all environments in which Birkhoff-von Neumann property obtains—in particular in
environments studied by Budish (2011) and Budish et al (2013)—our results show that every Pareto effi-
cient assignment may be supported in a Walrasian equilibrium.
7Our Second Welfare Theorem implies as a corollary that whenever feasibility in expectation is the
relevant feasibility concept, then the Second Welfare Theorem holds true for standard Pareto efficiency.
This is of relevance in large markets as Nguyen, Peivandi and Vohra (2016) extended the Birkhoff-von
Neumann Theorem to multi-unit assignment in large markets showing that the set of feasible-in-expectation
random assignments is asymptotically equivalent to the set of implementable random assignments. Following
on our analysis, Miralles and Pycia (2017) identify a sufficient condition for the Second Welfare Theorem to
obtain in multi-unit-demand environments with divisible goods, possibly nonlinear preferences, and agents
demanding goods up to a capacity quota (and hence possibly satiated).
8For the school choice setting, the First Welfare Theorem was established by Hylland and Zeckhauser
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Our Second Welfare Theorem for environments without transfers is the first such result
that allows for locally satiated agents.9 Indeed, we think it is quite surprising that the
insight of the Second Welfare Theorem holds true in the canonical no-transfer environment
we study because the problems the received approaches to the Second Welfare Theorem
run into in settings with locally satiated agents are well-known (Mas-Collel, Winston, and
Green, 1995) and seem robust. The failure of local non-satiation implies that the Separating
Hyperplane Theorem commonly used to prove the Second Welfare Theorem guarantees only
the existence of a separating hyperplane that may have non-empty intersections with the set
of Pareto-dominant aggregate assignments.10 Facing the resulting prices, some agents might
afford to buy bundles they strictly prefer over their assignment; this situation is called a
quasi-equilibrium.
To surmount the problems that satiation causes for the standard proof approach, we
develop a novel approach to constructing the separating hyperplane that leverages the poly-
tope properties of the no-transfer setting. As a key part of our proof, we establish a Full
Separation Lemma for Polytopes that might be useful beyond the confines of our Walrasian
analysis.11 The lemma establishes the existence of a separating hyperplane that is disjoint
with the set of Pareto-dominant aggregate assignments. Facing the resulting prices, no agent
can afford a bundle they would prefer over their assignment, and the prices support the as-
signment as an equilibrium. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first paper to leverage
the properties of the polytopes to analyze Walrasian equilibria and prove the Second Welfare
Theorem.12
Prior work on no-transfer assignments related price mechanisms to efficiency but only in
conjunction with other strong requirements. In continuum economies, Thomson and Zhou
(1993) related efficient, symmetric, and consistent mechanisms to Hylland and Zeckhauser’s
pseudomarket mechanism with equal budgets, and Ashlagi and Shi (2014) showed that any
(1979). This result was further refined and extended by Mas-Collel (1992) and Budish, Che, Kojima, and
Milgrom (2013). For instance, all equilibria are efficient if agents strictly rank any two objects. Note that
the validity of the First Welfare Theorem in some of the settings we study does not imply the validity of
the Second Welfare Theorem for these settings; indeed, there are environments in which the First Welfare
Theorem holds true, and the Second Welfare Theorem fails, cf. Mas-Collel et al (1995).
9See the literature discussion at the end of the Introduction. Whether the Second Welfare Theorem
obtains in settings without transfers and with possibly satiated agents was a puzzle except for deterministic
assignments in single-unit demand settings, for which Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez (1998) established a
version of the Second Welfare Theorem.
10While the full separation obtains if one of the separated sets is open, this assumption fails in our setting.
Section 3 provides an example illustrating the failure of openness and a more detailed discussion of why the
standard techniques do not work.
11We also prove a complementary Polytope Lemma that shows that the set of Pareto dominant outcomes
is a polytope, provided the resources being allocated are discrete.
12For earlier uses of polytope ideas to study other questions in economics, see e.g. McLennan (2002),
Budish et al (2013), Pycia and Unver (2015); none of these papers analyzes Walrasian equilibria.
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efficient, symmetric, and strategy-proof random assignment can be expressed as the result
of the equal-budget pseudomarket mechanism.13 In contrast, we do not rely on symmetry,
consistency, or strategy-proofness, and we prove our results for all finite economies.
Our paper also contributes to the literatures on constraints in market design—cf. e.g.
Budish, Che, Kojima, and Milgrom (2013) and He, Miralles, Pycia, and Yan (2018)—and on
multi-unit assignment—cf. e.g. Sonmez and Unver 2010, Budish 2011, and Budish and Can-
tillon 2012—that extended the idea of using token money to allocate objects in the absence
of transfers beyond the canonical Hylland and Zekchauser setting.14 Our Second Welfare
Theorem is complementary to these papers and provides a microfoundation for their focus
on pseudomarkets; none of these earlier papers provided such a microfoundation. We also
improve upon the First Welfare Theorems established in these papers by showing that pseu-
domarket equilibria are not only Pareto efficient but also strongly efficient, and our general
multi-unit demand setting goes beyond the settings studied in these papers: our analysis
allows arbitrary utility profiles over bundles of objects and arbitrary linear constraints. In
particular, our Second Welfare Theorem does not hinge on the standard assumption that
goods are substitutes, and it allows any mixture of substitutes and complementarities.15
Our paper provided a microfoundation for the focus on pseudomarkets in analysis of
efficient mechanisms in settings without transfers also for the many papers that followed on
our work. Papers that crucially rely on our Second Welfare Theorem include Miralles and
Pycia (2015), who address the question which assignments are efficient and envy-free and
show that the answer is qualitatively different in large finite markets than in a continuum
economy limit, as well as Miralles (2017) and Schlegel and Mamageishvili (2019), who study
He et al’s (2018) pseudomarkets with weak priorities. Other papers that followed on our
work and whose focus on pseudomarkets is microfounded by our Second Welfare Theorem in
settings without transfers include Babaioff, Nisan, Talgam-Cohen (2018), McLennan (2018),
Echenique, Miralles and Zhang (2019a, 2019b), and Gul, Pesendorfer and Zhang (2019); the
13Makowski, Ostroy, and Segal (1999) showed a similar result for the classical exchange economies, and
Hafalir and Miralles’ (2015) study more demanding utilitarian welfare. Subsequent to our work, Bogomolnaia
et al (2017, 2019) show that the utility profile of the equal-budget pseudomarket mechanisms maximize the
Nash product of utilities; in particular the resulting profile is fully determined by the set of feasible utility
profiles.
14For analysis of market design constraints beyond the token money mechanisms, see also e.g. Pycia and
Unver (2015), and Kojima and Kameda (2015). Beyond allocation, the token money ideas were used e.g. in
Manjunath’s (2014) analysis of two-sided matching.
15In this sense we are also contributing to the literature extending the economic analysis of matching
and allocation models beyond the standard substitutes assumption; cf. e.g. Sun and Yang (2006), Ostro-
vsky (2008), Pycia (2012), Baldwin and Klemperer (2019) for earlier analyses going beyond the substitute
assumption in environments other than allocation without money. At the current still early stage of this
literature and the literature on constraints, they focus primarily on existence results most closely related to
our secondary result, the First Welfare Theorem.
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focus of these papers is on versions of the First Welfare Theorem, particularly in the context
of fairness requirements or in the presence of constraints.16
Finally, we contribute to the literature on the Second Welfare Theorem beyond the stan-
dard exchange economy model. Anderson (1988) proved the Second Welfare Theorem for
exchange economies with nonconvex preferences; in contrast with us, he maintained the as-
sumption of local non-satiation. Florig and Rivera (2010) established an almost-everywhere
Second Welfare Theorem for large markets with continuum of agents; in contrast, our anal-
ysis is valid in finite markets. Richter and Rubinstein (2015) propose a general convex
geometry approach to welfare economics based on the concept of “primitive equilibrium,”
where a strict linear ordering arranges alternatives in order to create “budget” sets. They
prove a Second Welfare Theorem for the primitive equilibrium concept; when preferences are
strictly monotone, their primitive equilibrium concept corresponds to the standard equilib-
rium concept; however, when specialized to our setting, this equilibrium concept becomes
equivalent to the quasi-equilibrium discussed above.17
2 Base Model
We study a finite economy with agents i, j ∈ I = {1, ..., |I|} and indivisible objects x, y ∈
X = {1, ..., |X|}. Each object x is represented by a number of identical copies |x| ∈ N.
By S = (|x|)x∈X we denote the total supply of object copies in the economy. If agents have
outside options, we treat them as objects in X; in particular, this implies that
∑
x∈X |x| ≥ |I|.
We assume initially that agents demand at most one copy of an object; we fully relax this
assumption in Section 4. We allow random assignments and denote by qxi ∈ [0, 1] the proba-
bility that agent i obtains a copy of object x. Agent i’s random assignment qi = (q1i , ..., q
|X|
i )
is a probability distribution. The economy-wide assignment Q = (qxi )i∈I, x∈X is feasible if the
aggregate assignment (which we will denote as A(Q)) is weakly lower that the supply vector:
A(Q) ≡
∑
i∈I qi ≤ S. Let A denote the set of economy-wide random assignments, and
F ⊂ A denote the set of feasible random assignments. We call an assignment pure, or deter-
ministic, if each of its elements qxi is either 0 or 1. By the Birkhoff-von Neumann theorem,
16Cf. also the ongoing work of Baldwin et al (2020), who also focus on the First Welfare Theorem, as well
as Vazirani and Yannakakis’ (2020) analysis of the complexity of pseudomarket mechanisms.
17In Section 3 we provide an example of a quasi-equilibrium which is not an equilibrium; this quasi-
equilibrium is a primitive equilibrium in the sense of Richter and Rubinstein. To the best of our knowledge
the above discussion covers all extensions of the Second Welfare Theorem beyond the standard strictly
monotone and convex setting. Of course, the literature on Walrasian equilibria beyond this setting is richer,
and—in addition to the papers cited above (including in footnotes)—includes, for instance, Bergstrom (1976),
Manelli (1991), and Hara (2005) who focused on equilibrium existence and core convergence rather than on
the Second Welfare Theorem.
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a feasible random assignment can be expressed as a lottery over feasible pure assignments.
Agents are expected utility maximizers, and agent i’s utility from random assignment qi
equals the scalar product ui(qi) = vi · qi where vi = (vxi )x∈X ∈ [0,∞)
|X| is the vector of agent
i’s von Neumann-Morgenstein valuations for objects x ∈ X.
We study the connection between two concepts: efficiency and equilibrium. A feasible
random assignment Q∗ ∈ F is ex-ante Pareto efficient—or, simply, efficient—if no other
feasible random assignment Q ∈ F is weakly preferred by all agents and strictly preferred
by some agents.
A random assignment Q∗ ∈ F and a price vector p∗ ∈ RX constitute an equilibrium (or
Walrasian equilibrium) for a budget vector w∗ ∈ R|I|+ if Q∗ = (q∗i )i∈I is feasible in the sense
p∗ · q∗i ≤ w∗i for all i ∈ I, and ui(qi) > ui(q∗i ) =⇒ p∗ · qi > w∗i for all (qi)i∈I ∈ A.
3 The Second Welfare Theorem for School Choice
We now develop the Second Welfare Theorem for the canonical school choice setting. The
analysis serves as an example illustrating the approach that in the next section we apply to
derive a general Second Welfare Theorem for assignment with multi-unit demand.
Theorem 1. (The Second Welfare Theorem in Random Unit Assignments) If
Q∗ ∈ F is Pareto-efficient, then there is a vector of budgets w∗ ∈ R|I|+ and a vector of prices
p∗ ∈ R|X|+ such that Q∗ and p∗ constitute an equilibrium with budgets w∗.
Before laying out the proof, let us compare our problem to the standard second wel-
fare theorem with transfers and preferences that are convex and strictly monotonic. The
well-known argument in the standard setting relies on the celebrated separating hyperplane
theorem: for any two disjoint convex sets Y, Z ⊆ Rn there exists a price vector p ∈ Rn and
budget w ∈ R such that p · z ≥ w ≥ p · y for each z ∈ Z and y ∈ Y , thus achieving a partial
separation of Y and Z; the separation is full if one of the inequalities can be assumed to
be strict.18 In the standard proof, Y is the set of aggregate feasible assignments and Z is
the set of (infeasible) aggregate assignments that Pareto dominate a fixed efficient assign-
ment Q∗ = (q∗i )i∈I we want to implement.19 If now some agent i ∈ I strictly prefers some



















j , where the second inequality can be shown to be an
18See e.g. Boyd and Vandenberghe (2004).
19Note that these sets are convex and they are disjoint.
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equality. Setting wi = p · q∗i we conclude that
ui(qi) > ui(q
∗
i ) =⇒ p∗ · qi > w∗i ,
thus prices p and budgets wi give us a so-called quasi-equilibrium .
The key step of the standard proof is then to show that the above quasi-equilibrium is
in fact an equilibrium, that is
ui(qi) > ui(q
∗
i ) =⇒ p∗ · qi > w∗i
for all i ∈ I and for all (qi)i∈I ∈ A. This last step is by contradiction: we take an assignment
Q = (qi)i∈I that Pareto dominates Q∗ while there is an agent i for whom qi costs the same
as q∗i ; in the neighborhood of Q we then find an assignment that still Pareto dominates
Q∗ while being cheaper than it. This is a contradiction as in quasi-equilibrium no cheaper
assignment can Pareto dominate Q∗.
It is this key step of the standard proof that fails in our setting. The standard sepa-
rating hyperplane theorem partially separates the Pareto dominating aggregate assignments
from the feasible ones. In standard argument this is sufficient because the set of Pareto
dominating aggregate assignments is open; in contrast, in the settings we study, this set of
aggregate assignments does not need to be open. In effect, in our setting full separation does
not follow from the partial one; unlike in the standard setting, in the setting with locally sa-
tiated preferences and without transfers, not every quasi-equilibrium is an equilibrium. The
standard argument breaks at the claim that there is a cheaper but still Pareto-dominant
assignment; this step relies on the prices of goods being strictly positive, which obtains in
the standard setting as otherwise agents would demand an infinite amount of zero-price
goods. In contrast, zero prices are the staple of our setting as recognized already by Hylland
and Zeckhauser (1979). In particular, in a quasi-equilibrium an agent may be assigned a
zero-price object while he strictly prefers another zero-price object.
As an illustration of these problems, consider the following example.
Example 1. Consider an economy with four agents and three objects. Two of the agents
have von Neumann-Morgenstern utility vector v = (1
2
, 0, 1), and the remaining two agents
have the utility vector v′ = (0, 1, 1
2
). Suppose that there are three copies of object 1, one copy
of object 2, and one copy of object 3. The following allocation Q∗ is then Pareto-efficient:









The resulting aggregate assignment A (Q∗) is (2, 1, 1). Figure 1 places this point in the
barycentric simplex of aggregate assignments in which exactly four units are assigned, that is
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Figure 1: The simplex of “full-consumption” aggregate assignments. Aggregate assignment
A (Q∗) is on the intersection of the boundaries of sets Y and Z.
such that for each agent the sum of probabilities of the three goods is 1 (the full-consumption
simplex). Set Y represents feasible aggregate assignments in the simplex; it is the triangle
spanned by (2, 1, 1), (3, 0, 1) and (3, 1, 0). Set Z represents all aggregate assignments A (Q)
in the simplex such that there exists an assignment Q in which all agents are weakly better
off than under Q∗ and at least one agent is strictly better off, and such that A (Q) is the
aggregate assignment of Q (these assignments are, of course, not feasible). Set Z has five
corners:
• (2, 1, 1), the aggregate assignment corresponding to Q∗,













tain (0, 1, 0),
• (0, 0, 4), the aggregate assignment when each agent obtains good 3
• (1, 0, 3), the aggregate assignment when v-agents obtain q∗ and v′-agents obtain (0, 0, 1).
Only the middle three corners belong to Z, and one of the borders of Z, the dashed line, is
disjoint with Z. In particular, the set Z is neither open nor closed.
Restricting attention to the assignments in the simplex, there is a horizontal hyperplane
separating Y and Z. This hyperplane corresponds to prices p3 > p2 = p1 = 0. When
v-agents have budget 1
2
p3 and v′-agents have budget zero, these prices support Q∗ as a
quasi-equilibrium but not as an equilibrium. Indeed, v′-agents would rather buy a sure copy
of object 2 than the lottery q∗′, and both these outcomes have the price of zero.20
20As perceptively observed by a referee, this example has several features that might lead one to wonder
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We develop a new proof approach to establish the second welfare theorem and to address
the difficulties discussed above and illustrated in Example 1. To understand our approach,
observe that in Example 1, there are non-horizontal hyperplanes that fully separate Y and
Z (in the full-consumption simplex). We show that this is always the case. A key step in
the proof is the following new Full Separation Lemma that establishes that under conditions
that—as we will shortly see—are always satisfied in the no-transfer assignment problem, full
separation is possible. The full separation relies on the assumption that some of the relevant
sets are polytopes, where a polytope is the intersection of a finite number of half spaces.21
Lemma 1. (Full Separation Lemma) Let Y ⊂ Rn be a closed and convex polytope. Let
Z ⊂ Rn be convex, non-empty, and such that its closure Z̄ ⊂ Rn is a closed and convex
polytope. Suppose that Z ∩Y = ∅ and that for all y ∈ Y ∩ Z̄, δ ∈ Rn, and ε > 0 if y+ δ ∈ Z,
then y − εδ /∈ Z̄. Then, there exists a price vector p ∈ Rn+ and a budget w ∈ R such that for
any z ∈ Z and y ∈ Y we have p · z > w ≥ p · y and such that for any z̄ ∈ Z̄ and y ∈ Y we
have p · z̄ ≥ w ≥ p · y.
We provide the proof of the lemma in Appendix A.
We can easily visualize the statement of the lemma in the context of Example 1. Both the
set Y of feasible aggregate assignments and the set Z of (infeasible) aggregate assignments
that Pareto dominate Q∗ are polytopes. Our separation lemma states that if every line
through Q∗ and a point in Z has points that belong to the closure of Z only on one side of
Q∗, then there exists a fully separating hyperplane. The line assumption is satisfied in our
example.
whether the problems illustrated by the example can be avoided if we restrict attention to strictly positive
valuations or require non-zero budgets. Such simple solutions would not address the problems illustrated by
Example 1. For instance, we can add any constant to the valuations and multiple it by any scalar and in
such modified example the problematic partially separating hyperplane would still be present even though
all valuations are then strictly positive. We could endow v′-type agents with any positive budget without
otherwise changing the example, and the problematic hyperplane would still be there. We could also modify
the example so that all agents have strictly positive budgets and fully spent them: e.g. we could enrich the
example by adding a fourth good, which only has one unit available, and that types v′ like more than other
goods (and types v do not want to buy); in such a modification of the example, the price of the fourth good
would be strictly positive and equal to twice v′ types’ individual budgets and the problematic hyperplane
would still be present.
21The terminology varies in the literature, with some authors referring to this concept as polyhedra and
reserving the term polytope for compact polyhedra. We use the polytope in the above broader sense; in
particular, our lemma does not rely on compactness. In the proof of our lemma we rely on an elegant Polytope
Separation Lemma that McLennan (2002) developed in an ordinal context unrelated to the problems studied
in our paper, and that was never previously used to analyze Walrasian equilibria. McLennan’s lemma cannot
be substituted for our Full Separation Lemma in the simple proof of our Second Welfare Theorem presented
below because his lemma establishes only partial separation between polytopes, while our proof relies on full
separation established by our lemma. (The December 2014 draft of our paper sketched an alternative direct
proof of our Full Separation Lemma, and we would like to thank Andrew McLennan for directing us to his
lemma as a basis for the current simplified version of our proof).
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The rest of the proof of the second welfare theorem revolves around showing that indeed
the assumption of the lemma is satisfied: no line through Q∗ can intersect the closure of Z
on both sides of Q∗ (see the highlighted claim in the proof below).
Proof of the Second Welfare Theorem. For any random assignment Q ∈ A, we
define the aggregate assignment A (Q) associated with Q to be
∑
i∈I qi, and we write Q ≻ Q∗
when ui(qi) ≥ ui(q∗i ) for every i ∈ I with at least one strict inequality.
Let Z = {A (Q) : Q ≻ Q∗, Q ∈ A}, and notice that the above assumption implies that
Z is non-empty. Furthermore, Z is convex. Let Z̄ = Cl(Z) be the topological closure of Z,
and notice that Z̄ is a non-empty convex polytope. Let Y = {A (Q) : Q ∈ F} be the set of
aggregate feasible random assignments. This set is a closed and convex polytope, and the
efficiency of Q∗ implies that Z ∩ Y = ∅.
To use the full separation lemma, we need the following
Claim. For any y ∈ Y ∩ Z̄, δ ∈ R|X| and ε > 0, if y + δ ∈ Z then y − εδ /∈ Z̄.
Proof of the claim: If y + δ ∈ Z then there is a Q ≻ Q∗ such that A (Q) = y + δ.
By way of contradiction, assume y − εδ ∈ Z̄ = Cl(Z). Thus, there is a Q̃ = (q̃i)i∈I such









Q̃ is feasible, and the choice of Q and Q̃ and the linearity of utility ui(·) in
probabilities imply that Q̄ ≻ Q∗. But this contradicts the fact that Q∗ is efficient, proving
the claim.
This claim and the full separation lemma imply that there exists a price vector p ∈ R|X|+
and a budget w ∈ R such that p ·z > w ≥ p ·y, for any z ∈ Z and y ∈ Y . Since Q∗ is feasible∑
i∈I q
∗








i ≥ w because Q∗ ∈ Cl (Z).




i = w. Now, if we take some qi that some agent i ∈ I strictly prefers to





















Consequently we have p · qi > p · q∗i , proving that p and Q∗ constitute an equilibrium for
budgets w∗i = p · q∗i . QED
4 Multi-Unit Demand: Second and First Welfare The-
orems
We now analyze the validity of our Second Welfare Theorem result in assignment economies
in which participants demand multiple units of goods. As in the base model, we have a set
of agents I and a set of objects X. Each object x ∈ X has a finite number of copies |x| and
S = (|x|)x∈X is the supply vector. We relax the restriction that each agent demands at most
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one unit of goods and allow each agent to demand at most k ∈ N units of various goods in
total. We further assume that each agent receives exactly k units. Both of these assumptions
are without loss of generality because we allow objects that are supplied in large quantities
but are worthless for the agents, called null objects, and because k can be larger than the
total supply of non-null objects.
Let Bi ⊂ {0, 1, ..., k}|X| be the finite set of admissible individual bundles for agent i, and
let bi1, ..., bi|Bi| denote the elements of Bi. The set Bi can accommodate any restrictions such
as, for instance, that the agent consumes at most quantity 1 of each object. An individual
random assignment qi ∈ ∆(Bi) of agent i ∈ I is a probability distribution over Bi. The
agent’s expected utility is the scalar product qi ·vi where vi ∈ R|Bi| is the vector of valuations
for each bundle in Bi. For the sake of linear algebra calculations, we represent the set of
bundles Bi by the matrix βi = (bxib)x∈X,b∈Bi in which bxib is the quantity of object x in bundle
b.
A deterministic assignment of bundles D = (bi)i∈I ∈ ×i∈IBi is feasible if
∑
i∈I bi ≤ S,
coordinatewise. We denote by D the (finite) set of all feasible deterministic assignments
of bundles and by bi(D) the bundle that agent i obtains under the D ∈ D. We assume
throughout that set D is non-empty. Denoting B = ∪iBi, a random assignment of bundles
Q = (qbi )i∈I,b∈B ∈ [0, 1]
I×B is feasible in expectation if each q·i has support on Bi and





S. A random assignment Q = (qbi )i∈I,b∈B is feasible (or implementable) if there are






i . By F we denote the set of all feasible random assignments. Of
course, every feasible assignment is feasible in expectation.
A random assignment of bundles Q ex-ante Pareto-dominates a random assignment of
bundles Q∗ if qi · vi ≥ q∗i · vi for all i ∈ I, with at least one strict inequality. A feasible
random assignment of bundles Q∗ = {q∗i }i∈I is (ex-ante Pareto) efficient if it is not ex-ante
Pareto-dominated by any feasible random assignment of bundles. A random assignment of
bundles Q∗ is a (competitive) equilibrium assignment with prices p∗ ∈ R|X|+ and budgets
(w∗i )i∈I ∈ R
|I|
+ if, for every agent i ∈ I, p∗ · βiq∗i ≤ wi and if qi · vi > q∗i · vi for some random
assignment Q then p∗ · βiqi > wi.
Our single-unit demand Second Welfare Theorem immediately implies the multi-unit
demand Second Welfare Theorem if we allowed separate prices for all bundles. Indeed, then
we can think of agents as having a single-unit demand: each of them demands at most one
bundle.
The analysis becomes more subtle if we require—as in the definition of the competitive
equilibrium above—that the price of a bundle is the sum of prices of the component goods of
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the bundle. We can then still apply our Full Separation Lemma and replicate the single-unit
demand analysis provided every random assignment that is feasible in expectation is feasible.
This property—established in the single-unit case in the Birkhoff-von Neumann Theorem—
ensures that if we moved from an initial (feasible) aggregate assignment in some direction to
a (non-feasible) Pareto-dominating aggregate assignment, then when moving in the opposite
direction the assignments are not weakly Pareto dominant as otherwise a proper linear com-
bination of both assignments would be feasible by the Birkhoff-von Neumann property and
it would Pareto dominate the initial assignment. In consequence, in environments satisfying
the Birkhoff-von Neumann property we can directly apply our Full Separation Lemma.
There are multi-unit demand settings in which the Birkhoff-von Neumann property is true
such as, for instance, the setting in which each agent buys up to some quantity cap of each
object, and two lotteries over bundles are treated as equivalent when they are equivalent
as lotteries over the quantities of objects; the equivalence which is natural if each agent
i’s utility from a feasible bundle of objects is given by the sum of agent’s von Neumann-
Morgenstern valuations ṽi =
(




for objects in the bundle, that is the utility from
bundle qi =
(




∈ Xi is the scalar product qiṽ; the utility from other bundles is
zero (cf. Budish et al 2013).22
At the same time, the Birkhoff-von Neumman Theorem does not in general extend to
multi-unit assignments, as pointed out by Nguyen, Peivandi and Vohra (2016). The following
example illustrates their point that for some infeasible assignments Q = (qi)i∈I /∈ F the
aggregate feasibility condition
∑
i∈I βiqi ≤ S might be satisfied. We use this example in
further developments of this subsection.
Example 2. Consider the problem of assigning four objects S = (1, 1, 1, 1) to two agents so
that each of them receives two objects. The set of possible bundles is
B = {(1, 1, 0, 0), (1, 0, 1, 0), (1, 0, 0, 1), (0, 1, 1, 0), (0, 1, 0, 1), (0, 0, 1, 1)}.
The random assignment Q = (q1, q2) where q1 = (1/2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1/2) and q2 = (0, 0, 1/2, 1/2, 0, 0)




i = S. However, Q is not feasible. If
there is (λD)D∈D ≥ 0,
∑
D∈D λD = 1 meeting the condition in the definition, there must
22Budish et al. (2013) discuss how any profile of random assignments (qi)i∈I that satisfies the above
constraints can be implemented as lotteries over deterministic assignments. They also prove the First Welfare
Theorem for the case of equal budgets and additive utilities and showed how to use Milgrom’s (2009) integer
assignment messages to reduce certain non-linear preferences to this linear setting. The single-unit demand
setting is the special case of the multi-unit demand setting, in which |i| = 1 for each agent i. As implied
by our discussion of Birkhoff-von Neumann’s property, our Second Welfare Theorem remains true for any
type of consumption constraints Xi that satisfy Birkhoff-von Neumann’s property, e.g. because they satisfy
Budish et al’s hierarchy condition or Pycia and Unver’s (2015) decomposition conditions.
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be D ∈ D such that b1(D) = (1, 1, 0, 0) and λD > 0. However, λD > 0 implies that
b2(D) ∈ {(1, 0, 0, 1), (0, 1, 1, 0)}. In either case D generates excess demand for either ob-
ject 1 or object 2, contradicting D ∈ D.
Where the Birkhoff-von Neumann property fails, our previous analysis requires refine-
ment. This applies not only to our proof but also the formulation of our Second Welfare
Theorem. This is demonstrated by the following
Proposition 1. Not every efficient feasible random assignment Q∗ is an equilibrium assign-
ment.
Proof. Consider again the two agents and four objects from Example 2, with the set of
feasible bundles studied in this example. Assume that v1 = (1, 1 − ε, 0, 0, 1 − ε, 1) and





. Consider assignment (q∗1, q∗2) such that q∗1 =
(0, 1/2, 0, 0, 1/2, 0) and q∗2 = (0, 1/2, 0, 0, 1/2, 0) where the probabilities of bundles in B are
listed in the same order as the bundles in Example 4. This assignment is feasible because




lottery between two feasible deterministic assignments:
((1, 0, 1, 0), (0, 1, 0, 1)) and ((0, 1, 0, 1), (1, 0, 1, 0)).
The assignment (q∗1, q∗2) is also efficient. By way of contradiction, suppose that some other
assignment (q1, q2) Pareto dominates (q∗1, q∗2). As the expected utility from the assignment
Q∗ is 1− ε for both agents, we have
q11 + q
6
















where superscripts on probabilities q1i , ..., q6i denote the position in which the bundles are
listed in B. Denoting ρ1 ≡ q11+q61 = q12+q62, ρ2 ≡ q31+q41 = q32+q42, and ρ3 ≡ q21+q51 = q22+q52,
and recognizing that 1− ρ3 = ρ1 + ρ2, we can rewrite the above inequalities as
ρ1 ≥ (1− ρ3) (1− ϵ) = (ρ1 + ρ2) (1− ϵ) ,
ρ2 ≥ (1− ρ3) (1− ϵ) = (ρ1 + ρ2) (1− ϵ) .
Because ε < 1/2, this system of inequalities cannot be satisfied unless ρ1 = ρ2 = 0. Hence,
(q1, q2) must put all the weight on the second and fifth bundle, just like (q∗1, q∗2), and we can
conclude that no feasible random assignment Pareto-dominating (q∗1, q∗2).
In spite of being feasible and efficient, (q∗1, q∗2) cannot be an equilibrium assignment.
Indeed, for any vector of prices p ∈ R|X|+ the cost of each of the bundles q∗1, q∗2, q1 =
(1/2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1/2), and q2 = (0, 0, 1/2, 1/2, 0, 0) is 12
∑
x p
x, while qi · vi > q∗i · vi for both
i ∈ {1, 2}.
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4.1 Second Welfare Theorem
In order to recover the Second Welfare Theorem we will strengthen the Pareto efficiency
requirement. We say that a feasible random assignment of bundles Q∗ is strongly efficient
if it is not ex-ante Pareto-dominated by any feasible-in-expectation random assignment of
bundles. Because every feasible assignment is feasible in expectation, strong efficiency is
indeed more demanding than efficiency we studied so far. A positive feature of strong
efficiency, and an advantage over the efficiency concept studied above, is that verifying it
does not require the market participants to verify whether swaps of probabilities can be
implemented; it is the natural concept when thinking in terms of marginal probabilities. In
all settings that satisfy the Birkhoff-von Neuman Theorem, strong efficiency and efficiency
are of course equivalent.
The following result then holds23
Theorem 2. (Second Welfare Theorem for General Multi-unit Demands) If a
feasible random assignment of bundles Q∗ is strongly efficient, then it is an equilibrium
random assignment supported by some vector of prices p∗ ∈ R|X|+ and some vector of budgets
w∗ = (w∗i )i∈I ∈ R
|I|
+ .
We prove this theorem as an immediate corollary from the following
Theorem 3. If a feasible-in-expectation random assignment of bundles Q∗ cannot be ex-ante
Pareto-dominated by any other feasible-in-expectation random assignment of bundles, then
Q∗ is an equilibrium random assignment supported by some prices p∗ ∈ R|X|+ and budgets
(w∗i )i∈I ∈ R
|I|
+ .
The latter result is more general because it only requires random assignment of bundles
Q∗ to be feasible in expectation.
Remark 1. In both of Theorems 2 and 3, we can add that the equilibrium we construct
satisfies the following complementary slackness condition: px∗ > 0 implies that there is no






i = |x|. To see this suppose that there is an excess supply






i < |x| then the set of feasible assignments
contains assignments with more of object x than Q∗ as well as assignments with less of
object x than Q∗. In particular, the separating hyperplane between feasible assignments and
dominant assignments contains a line parallel to x-axis. Hence, the resulting price vector is







23Combining this result and the previous proposition, we can conclude that in the setting of Example 4
efficiency does not imply strong efficiency.
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Figure 2: Piece-wise linearity of preferences over expected allocations.
hence q∗i = 0 for all agents i, and the efficiency of assignment Q∗ allows us to set the price
of good x at zero without affecting the equilibrium demands of agents.
To get a sense of the proof of Theorem 3, notice that each random assignment over
bundles determines the expected assignment of agent i over the underlying goods, µi = βiqi.
Because the prices are defined on the underlying goods, every lottery over bundles that leads
to the same expected assignment over the underlying goods has the same price. We can
also input utility to the expected assignment by recognizing that in the equilibrium an agent
buys the lottery over bundles in Bi that maximizes the agent’s utility among all lotteries of
the same price. For every expected assignment µi in the convex hull of Bi—the convex hull




The following property of this utility function allows us to apply the methods we developed
for the single-demand case and prove the second welfare theorem.
Lemma 2. (Polytope Lemma) For every µi ∈ Co(Bi), the upper contour set Ui(µi) =
{µ ∈ Co(Bi) : Vi(µ) ≥ Vi (µi)} of assignments better than µi for agent i is a convex polytope.
The proof of this lemma is in Appendix B. The key claim of the lemma is that the upper
contour set is a polytope. To get a sense for why this claim is true consider the example
illustrated in Figure 2. In the figure, agent i has four possible bundles, Bi = {bi1, ..., bi4},
and the the convex hull Co (Bi) takes the shape of the rhomboid. The highlighted dot
represents an expected assignment µi. This expected assignment is a convex combination of
{bi1, bi3, bi4} and it is also a convex combination of {bi2, bi3, bi4}. Indeed, by the well-known
Carathéodory’s theorem, any expected assignment in Co (Bi) is a convex combination of
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just three extreme points in Bi.24 The weights in each of these two convex combinations are
unique, and any other representation of µi as a convex combination of {bi1, bi2, bi3, bi4} can
be decomposed as a convex combination of these two 3-point convex combinations. Taking
into account that Vi(µi) is the maximum of a linear function, to calculate Vi (µi) we only
need to know the utility V at these two 3-point convex combinations. This analysis remains
valid for any expected assignment in the interior of the triangle span by points A, bi3, and
bi4. Thus, the aforementioned triangle can be divided into a finite number (here: two) of
regions on which the set of bundles implementing V is constant. Linearity of the objective
function guarantees that there is a hyperplane separating these two regions. If—as in the
figure—the expected assignment µi is not on this separating hyperplane, then there is a
neighborhood of µi on which the maximizer convex combination comes from the same set,
say {bi2, bi3, bi4}. In the figure, this is true for all points in the interior of the triangle span
by points A,C, and bi3 (note this is a smaller triangle than the one referred to previously).
Thus the preferences are linear in a neighborhood of the expected assignment µi. The
figure represents the neighborhood of µi by a ball, and it also illustrates the parallel linear
indifference curves and the direction in which utility increases.
Lemma 2 enables us to leverage the methods we developed in Section 3 to prove Theorem
3. The proof, similarly to the proof of Theorem 1, leverages our general Full Separation
Lemma (Lemma 1).
Proof of Theorem 3. Let Y = {m ∈
∑
i∈I Co(Bi) : m ≤ S} be the set of feasible















µi = m& (∀i ∈ I)Vi(µi) ≥ Vi (µ∗i ) & (∃i)Vi(µi) ≥ Vi (µ∗i )
)}
.
Because Q∗ is not ex-ante Pareto-dominated by any other feasible-in-expectation random
assignment, Z ∩ Y = ∅. Furthermore, the aggregate upper contour set U =
∑
i∈I Ui(µi) is
a closure of Z and, by Lemma 2, U is a polytope.
To be able to apply our Full Separation Lemma it remains to verify that for no z ∈ Z
and y ∈ Y , there is ε > 0 such that y− ε(z− y) ∈ U. By way of contradiction suppose there
are such z, y and ε. Then, there is some µ = (µi)i∈I such that
∑
i∈I µi = y − ε(z − y) and,





and, for all i ∈ I, Vi(µ′i) ≥ Vi (µ∗i ), with strict inequality for some i. Consider the expected
24We thank Jordi Massó for directing us to the Carathéodory’s theorem.
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i = y ≤ S, and, by convexity of Vi





i) ≥ Vi (µ∗i ), with
strict inequality for some i. This contradicts the fact that Q∗ is strongly efficient.
Thus we can apply the Full Separation Lemma to conclude that there is a hyperplane
that fully separates Y and Z. The rest of the proof is standard and follows the same step
as the analogous part of Theorem 1 above. QED
4.2 First Welfare Theorem
An immediate question is whether all equilibrium outcomes are strongly efficient? We ad-
dress this question by proving the First Welfare Theorem for strong efficiency under two
assumptions. We assume that every agent buys a lowest-cost (cheapest) among all optimal
affordable lotteries, a standard assumption in the analysis of the pseudomarkets introduced
and motivated by Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979). The lowest-cost assumption is, for in-
stance, implied by the generic assumption that each agent has a unique favorite bundle,
which immediately implies that each agent buys a cheapest favorite affordable bundle. We
also restrict attention to equilibria satisfying the complementary slackness condition: px∗ > 0







Theorem 4. (First Welfare Theorem) Let Q∗ be an equilibrium assignment with prices
p∗ ∈ R|X|+ and budgets (w∗i )i∈I ∈ R
|I|
+ such that the complementary slackness condition is
satisfied and each agent buys one of her lowest-cost optimal affordable lotteries over bundles.
Then, Q∗ is strongly efficient.
Proof. By way of contradiction, suppose Q∗ = {q∗i }i∈I is not strongly efficient. Then
there is an expected allocation (µi)i∈I such that
∑
i∈I µi ≤ S and Vi(µi) ≥ q∗i ·vi for all i ∈ I,
with at least one inequality strict. If an agent i is not satiated under q∗i —that is with positive
probability her outcome is worse than her most preferred bundle—then p∗ · µi ≥ p∗ · βiq∗i by
the same argument that works in standard competitive equilibrium theory with non-satiated
agents.26 If agent i is satiated then the same inequality holds provided she bought the least
expensive most-preferred lottery. The same argument, gives us p∗ · µi > p∗ · βiq∗i for agents




∗ · µi >
∑
i∈I p
∗ · βiq∗i . In particular, there is an object x with positive price
25While the complementary slackness condition is trivially satisfied in environments with transfers, in our
settings it is a substantial restriction. It is needed in the sense that we also show that all strongly efficient
assignments can be implemented via equilibria satisfying complementary slackness, cf. Remark 1.
26Suppose p∗ · µi < p∗ · βiq∗i and let bi be a most preferred bundle of agent i. We can then find a small
weight α > 0 such that Vi(αbi + (1−α)µi) > q∗i · vi and p∗ · (αb∗i + (1− α)µi) ≤ p∗ · βiq∗i , contradicting that
q∗i was an optimal choice in i’s budget set.
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i = |x| (no excess supply). We thus obtain a contradiction
with the assumption that
∑
i∈I µi ≤ S. QED
4.3 Existence
The final question to answer is whether strongly efficient assignments (and hence competi-
tive equilibria) exist. The potential subtlety here is that strongly efficient feasible random
assignment need to be favorable compared to both feasible and unfeasible random assign-
ment of bundles. It turns out that in general a feasible random assignment of bundles that is
strongly efficient might not exist.27 However, it does exist when preferences over bundles are
strict and since this is a generic property so is the existence of strongly efficient assignments.
Theorem 5. (Existence) If preferences over bundles do not show indifferences then a
feasible random assignment of bundles that is strongly efficient always exists.
The proof is straightforward as under strict preferences the following procedure (serial
dictatorship mechanisms, adjusted for feasibility if needed) generates a strongly efficient
assignment. We take an arbitrary ordering of agents, i1, ..., i|I| and we assign to i1 his or her







is feasible, we assign to i2 his or her most preferred bundle bi2 such that there exists bundles












Our model allows for many design constraints such as e.g. reserving some seats in a school
for a group of applicants, while allowing all applicants to compete for the remaining seats;
27We illustrate it in the following example that builds on the first example and the proposition of this sec-
tion. Recall that B = {(1, 1, 0, 0), (1, 0, 1, 0), (1, 0, 0, 1), (0, 1, 1, 0), (0, 1, 0, 1), (0, 0, 1, 1)}, S = (1, 1, 1, 1), v1 =




. The set of feasible deterministic allocations
is constituted by D1 = ((1, 1, 0, 0), (0, 0, 1, 1)), D2 = ((1, 0, 1, 0), (0, 1, 0, 1)), D3 = ((1, 0, 0, 1), (0, 1, 1, 0)),
D4 = ((0, 1, 1, 0), (1, 0, 0, 1)), D5 = ((0, 1, 0, 1), (1, 0, 1, 0)), D6 = ((0, 0, 1, 1), (1, 1, 0, 0)). None of these deter-
ministic assignments give maximum expected utility 1 to both agents. Every feasible random assignment of
bundles is a lottery over D = {D1, ..., D6}. However, all of these deterministic assignments (and thus all of
the feasible random assignments of bundles) are dominated by the unfeasible random assignment Q = (q1, q2)
where q1 = (1/2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1/2) and q2 = (0, 0, 1/2, 1/2, 0, 0) because it gives the maximum expected utility 1
to each agent. In particular, no feasible assignment is strongly feasible. In light of our results, this implies
that no feasible assignment is supported as a competitive equilibrium in which every agent buys the cheapest
optimal affordable bundle. There are however equilibria—not satisfying the cheapest-bundle assumption—
that support some feasible bundles. For instance, the deterministic allocation D1 might be sustained by
prices p∗ = (100, 100, 0, 0) and budgets w∗1 = 200, w∗2 = 0. In this equilibrium, agent 1 buys a positive price
bundle even though this agent could have bought the equally optimal bundle (0, 0, 1, 1) at zero cost. Notice
the role of the indifference between favorite bundles in this outcome.
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to model such constraint we create an auxiliary object “reserved seats” and we define the
sets Bi in such a way that individual allocations with copies of the reserved seats object are
feasible only for the selected group of applicants.
Furthermore, all of our results remain valid—with no changes in proofs—under any con-
junction of linear constraints imposed on random and deterministic assignments as long as
the set of feasible assignments remains nonempty.28
5 Conclusion
We have established the Second Welfare Theorem for the general class of single-unit demand
and multi-unit demand assignment problems without transfers. We show that in large range
of market design settings—from school choice to course allocation—efficient assignments
can be implemented by price mechanisms, thus providing the foundations for the literature’s
focus on such mechanisms. Our Second Welfare Theorem has already played the role of a
revelation principle for no-transfer mechanism design.29
In addition to this substantive insight, we developed a novel approach to analyzing Wal-
rasian markets in which agents’ preferences fail the standard local non-satiation assumption;
our approach builds on the polytope properties of the Walrasian markets for discrete re-
sources.
Our analysis allows arbitrary utility profiles over bundles of objects and arbitrary linear
constraints, thus contributing both to the literature on constraints in market design as well
as the literature on complementarities and substitutes.30
A Proof of Lemma 1 (Full Separation Lemma)
We say that Z̄ is partially separated (or simply, separated) from Y when there is scalar
w ∈ R and price vector p ∈ Rn such that p · z̄ ≥ w ≥ p · y for all z̄ ∈ Z̄ and y ∈ Y. We say
that Z is fully separated from Y when there is scalar w ∈ R and price vector p ∈ Rn such
that p · z > w ≥ p · y for all z ∈ Z and y ∈ Y.
28Indeed, under any such conjunction of constraints the polytopes in the proofs of our Second Welfare
Theorems (Theorems 1, 2, and 3) remain polytopes and all the steps of the proofs and all our lemmas,
including our Full Separation Lemma, remain applicable. The proof of the First Welfare Theorem (Theorem
4) remains valid because imposing a conjunction of linear constraints preserves the convexity of sets we work
with; for the role of convexity in this proof see footnote 26. The proof of our existence result (Theorem 5)
only relies on the non-emptiness of the set of feasible assignments and as such also remains unaffected.
29Cf. Miralles and Pycia (2015), Miralles (2017) and Schlegel and Mamageishvili (2019), as well as other
papers discussed in the introduction.
30We discuss these literatures in the introduction.
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Let P be a polytope in Rn that is the intersection of a finite number of half spaces; each
half-space bounded by a hyperplane. Let H1, ..., HK be the set of these hyperplanes; we refer
to them as the hyperplanes defining P . A face of P is an intersection P ∩ (∩k∈JHk) for some
J ⊆ {1, ..., K}, and we also call the empty set a face of P .31 The affine hull of a set, denoted
aff, is the collection of all finite linear combinations of points in the set with weights adding
up to 1 (with negative weights allowed, as opposed to a convex hull). In the proof we will
use McLennan’s (2002) Separating Hyperplane Theorem, which states the following:32
Lemma 3. (McLennan’s Separating Hyperplane Theorem) Suppose Y ⊂ Rn and
Z̄ ⊂ Rn are polyhedra. Let FY be the intersection of all faces of Y that contain Y ∩ Z̄ and
let FZ̄ be the intersection of all faces of Z̄ that contain Y ∩ Z̄. If aff(FY ∪ FZ̄) ̸= Rn, then
there is a hyperplane H that separates Rn into two half spaces H+ and H− where Y ⊆ H−
and Z̄ ⊆ H+ such that Y ∩H = FY and Z̄ ∩H = FZ̄.
As a consequence we conclude
Lemma 4. Suppose Y ⊂ Rn and Z̄ ⊂ Rn are polyhedra. Let FY be the intersection of all
faces of Y that contain Y ∩Z̄ and let FZ̄ be the intersection of all faces of Z̄ that contain Y ∩Z̄.
Either there exists a hyperplane H that separates Rn into two half spaces H+ and H− where
Y ⊆ H− and Z̄ ⊆ H+ such that Y ∩H = FY and Z̄ ∩H = FZ̄, or else aff(FY ∪ FZ̄) = Rn
and Y = FY and Z̄ = FZ̄.
Proof of Lemma 4. If aff(FY ∪FZ̄) ̸= Rn then the claim follows from McLennan’s Lemma.
It remains to consider the case when aff(FY ∪ FZ̄) = Rn. Suppose we embed Y and Z̄ in
Rn×R as Y ×{0} and Z̄×{0}, respectively. Then, McLennan’s Lemma implies the existence
of a hyperplane H that separates Rn+1 into two half spaces H+ and H− where Y ×{0} ⊆ H−
and Z̄ × {0} ⊆ H+ such that Y × {0} ∩H = FY × {0} and Z̄ × {0} ∩H = FZ̄ × {0}. The
two inclusions allow us to infer that Y × {0} ⊆ H and Z̄ × {0} ⊆ H. Furthermore, the two
equalities and aff(FY ∪ FZ̄) = Rn allows us to conclude that H = Rn × {0}. The claim of
Lemma 5 then follows. QED
We now turn to the proof of our Full Separation Lemma. We may assume that Y ∩ Z̄ is
non-empty as otherwise the lemma follows from the standard separating hyperplane theorem
for closed convex sets.33 Let S be the affine hull of Y ∩ Z̄. Being an affine hull, S is a linear
subspace of Rn. Furthermore, S is a linear subspace of dimension lower than n. Indeed, if
31Notice that we allow J = ∅ and hence P is a face of itself.
32McLennan developed this theorem in an ordinal context unrelated to the problems studied in our paper,
and it was never previously used to analyze Walrasian equilibria.
33The theorem says that there is a fully separating hyperplane for any two disjoint convex closed sets in
Rn, see e.g. Boyd and Vandenberghe (2004).
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not then the convexity of Y ∩ Z̄ would imply that there is an open ball B ⊂ Y ∩ Z̄ around
some point y∗ ∈ Y ∩ Z̄. But then, taking any z ∈ Z and setting δ = z − y∗, we would find
an ϵ > 0 such that y∗ − ϵδ ∈ B contrary to y∗ − ϵδ ̸∈ Z̄.
Let FZ̄ be the intersection of all faces of Z̄ that contain Y ∩Z̄, that is FZ̄ is the intersection
of Z̄ with all hyperplanes that define faces of Z̄ and contain Z̄ ∩ Y . Similarly, let FY be
the intersection of all faces of Y that contain Y ∩ Z̄. From Lemma 4, we know that either
(i) there exists a hyperplane H that separates Rn into two half spaces H+ and H− where
Y ⊆ H− and Z̄ ⊆ H+ such that Y ∩H = FY and Z̄ ∩H = FZ̄ , or else (ii) aff(FY ∪FZ̄) = Rn
and Y = FY and Z̄ = FZ̄ .
Consider case (i). Because Z ∩H ⊆ Z ∩FZ̄ , to prove that H fully separates Z and Y , it
is sufficient to show that Z ∩ FZ̄ = ∅ . Suppose not. FZ̄ is non-empty. If FZ̄ is a singleton
then let z be the only point contained in FZ̄ . Because Z̄ ∩ Y = FZ̄ ∩ Y is nonempty, we
conclude that z ∈ Y and because Z ∩ FZ̄ is non-empty we conclude that z ∈ Z. But this
contradicts Z ∩ Y = ∅. We can thus assume that FZ̄ contains at least two points. Define
the relative interior of a set to be the interior of this set in the linear space spanned by the
affine hull of this set. Because FZ̄ is a convex polytope, its relative interior, denoted ri(FZ̄),
is nonempty. Because FZ̄ is the intersection of Z̄ and all the hyperplanes Hk defining Z̄ and
containing Y ∩ Z̄, we can infer that Y ∩ ri(FZ̄) ̸= ∅. Indeed, if Y ∩ ri(FZ̄) = ∅ then the
intersection Y ∩ Z̄ = Y ∩ FZ̄ of the polytopes Y and Z̄ would be disjoint with the relative
interior of FZ̄ and hence, being convex, this intersection would be contained in a face of FZ̄
that is a proper subset of FZ̄ . But this is a contradiction as FZ̄ is the smallest face of Z̄
containing Y ∩ Z̄. Let thus a ∈ Y ∩ ri(FZ̄), and, by way of contradiction, assume that there
is z∗ ∈ Z ∩ FZ̄ . Because z∗ ∈ FZ̄ and a ∈ ri(FZ̄), we infer that a − ε[z∗ − a] ∈ FZ̄ ⊆ Z̄ for
any ε > 0 small enough, and the assumptions of our lemma imply that a + [z∗ − a] ̸∈ Z, a
contradiction.
Finally, we show that case (ii) cannot happen. If it did then Z̄ = FZ̄ and hence Z̄ itself
would be the only face of Z̄ that contains Y ∩ Z̄. Because Y is convex, this would imply
that Y has a non-empty intersection with the relative interior of Z̄. Let a ∈ Y ∩ ri(Z̄) and
let z∗ ∈ Z. Because z∗ ∈ Z̄ and a ∈ ri(Z̄), we infer that a− ε[z∗−a] ∈ Z̄ for any ε > 0 small
enough, and the assumptions of our lemma imply that a+ [z∗− a] ̸∈ Z, a contradiction that
concludes the proof of the Full Separation Lemma. QED
B Proof of Lemma 2 (Polytope Lemma)
The next two lemmas jointly imply the result.
Lemma 5. (Convexity) Preferences represented by Vi are convex.
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Proof. Take λ ∈ [0, 1] and µi, µ′i ∈ Co(Bi). We need to show that λVi(µi) + (1 −
λ)Vi(µ
′
i) ≤ Vi (λµi + (1− λ)µ′i). By the definition of V , there is q ∈ ∆(Bi) such that βiq = µi
and Vi(µi) = q · vi. Similarly, there is q′ ∈ ∆(Bi) such that βiq′ = µ′i and Vi(µ′i) = q′ · vi.
Then,
λVi(µi) + (1− λ)Vi(µ′i)




= Vi(λµi + (1− λ)µ′i)
where the inequality follows because βi[λq + (1 − λ)q′] = λµi + (1 − λ)µ′i, and hence q′′ =
λq + (1− λ)q′ is in the set the maximum above is taken over. QED
Lemma 6. (Local Affinity) Let i be an agent. Let L be the linear space spanned by Bi and
let d be its dimension. For almost every µi ∈ Co(Bi), there exists a convex L-neighborhood
M ⊆ Co(Bi) of µi such that Vi is an affine function of µ on M ; that is, for all µ, µ′ ∈ M
and λ ∈ [0, 1], Vi (λµ+ (1− λµ′)) = λVi (µ) + (1− λ)Vi (µ′).
Proof. The set D of expected assignments in Co (Bi) that can be represented as a
convex combination of d or fewer points in Bi is of measure zero in L. This claim follows
from two observations. First, the convex hull of any d or fewer points is of dimension at
most d − 1, and hence of measure zero in the d-dimensional space L. Second, there is only
a finite number of subsets in Bi because Bi itself is finite.
Let us fix an expected assignment µi ∈ Co(Bi)−D. Let Bi (µi) be the set of all B ⊆ Bi
such that |B| ≤ d + 1 and µi is a convex combination of elements from B. Because µi ̸∈ D
we infer that each B ∈ Bi (µi) has exactly d+1 elements. Bi (µi) is finite because Bi is finite.
Bi (µi) is nonempty because Carathéodory’s Theorem tells us that µi can be represented as
a convex combination of d + 1 elements of Bi. Furthermore, for any B ∈ Bi (µi) there is
exactly one convex combination of elements of B that gives µi. Indeed, if there were two
such convex combinations then µi would also be a convex combination of elements from a
proper subset of B; a contradiction because |B| = d+ 1 and µi ̸∈ D.
By definition of Vi, there is B ∈ Bi (µi) such that Vi (µi) = q · vi for some q ∈ ∆(Bi) such
that µi = βiqi, and qb > 0 iff b ∈ B. Let us denote by µ1, ..., µd+1 the expected assignments








1− qb|b ∈ B
})
, the set Bε of convex
combinations of elements of B with weight on each b ∈ B taken from
(
qb − ε, qb + ε
)
is a
convex full-dimensional open subset of Co (Bi), and hence a convex L-neighborhood of µi.
We claim that for sufficiently small ε > 0, all expected assignments in Bε have a unique
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decomposition as a convex combination over a subset of Bi (µi), and this unique decompo-
sition is over B. Indeed, if not then there is a sequence of µℓi ∈ Co (Bi) that tends to µi as
ℓ → ∞ and such that all µℓi have at least two convex decompositions over subsets of Bi (µi).
Same argument as above shows that then all µℓi ∈ D and we can select a subsequence ℓn
such that all µℓni are convex combinations of the same d (or fewer) points in B. But then
µi = limn→∞ µ
ℓn
i would also be a convex combination of the same d (or fewer) points in B,
a contradiction.
Take ε that is sufficiently small in the sense of the above claim. Then, µi is an arbitrary
element of the full measure subset of Co (Bi), and the uniqueness of the convex decomposition
implies that for all q ∈ ∆(Bi) such that qb > 0 iff b ∈ B and βiq belongs to the convex
neighborhood M = Bε of µi, the utility Vi (βiq) = q · vi. Thus, Vi is affine on M . QED
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